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The effect of institutional investors' distraction on firms' corporate social 
responsibility engagement: evidence from China 
 
Abstract: To investigate the impact of institutional investors on firms’ corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) engagement while controlling for possible endogeneity 
concerns, we study how Chinese listed firms adjust their CSR decisions when their 
institutional investors are distracted by exogenous attention-grabbing events and thus 
are inattentive. With a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2017, we find a 
significant and robust negative relationship between institutional investor inattention 
and firms’ CSR engagement. This negative relationship is more pronounced for firms 
with more principal-agent problems and/or weaker corporate governances and is more 
attributable to the inattention of institutional investors with more monitoring incentives. 
These findings suggest that managers are less motivated to engage in CSR when they 
are less monitored by institutional investors, indicating that CSR is beneficial to 
shareholders of Chinese listed firms. Our findings also indicate that the positive impact 
of institutional investors on CSR may be constrained by their limited attention. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement has become 
an important business practice worldwide. However, there is still an intense debate on 
whether CSR is beneficial to shareholder wealth. One stream of literature believes that 
CSR is initiated by managers’ self-interest behaviors caused by agency problems 
(Tirole 2001; Benabou and Tirole 2010; Barnea and Rubin 2010; Martinez-Ferrero and  
Garcia-Sanchez 2015; Cheng et al. 2016a) and therefore, is harmful to shareholder 
wealth. The other stream of literature argues that CSR helps to create firm value for 
shareholders by mitigating firm risk (Ye and Zhang 2011; Gong et al. 2018), reducing 
information asymmetry (Martinez-Ferrero et al. 2018; Reverte 2016; Cui et al. 2018), 
improving board independence (Fernandez-Gago et al. 2016), generating moral capital 
among stakeholders (Lins et al. 2017) and gaining consumer support (Tian et al. 2011; 
Elfenbein et al. 2012; Servaes and Tamayo 2013). 
One way to enter this debate is to investigate the impact of institutional investors 
on CSR engagement. As important shareholders, institutional investors have both the 
incentives and the power to affect firms’ CSR decisions (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Dyck et 
al. 2019). Naturally, institutional investors would urge managers to engage more (less) 
in CSR if CSR is beneficial (harmful) to shareholder wealth. However, prior studies 
regarding the impact of institutional investors on CSR have reached mixed results (Choi 
et al. 2013; Petersen and Vredenburg 2009; Harjoto and Jo 2011; Dyck et al. 2019)1. 
Also, most prior studies investigate the impact of institutional investors on CSR through 
                            
1  Additionally, see Faller and Knyphausen-Aufsess (2018) for a literature review regarding the impact of 
institutional ownership on CSR. 
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the perspective of institutional ownership, assuming that firms’ institutional ownership, 
which is the percentage of firm shares owned by institutional investors such as mutual 
funds, banks, insurance companies, etc., is an appropriate proxy for institutional 
investors’ monitoring intensity, i.e., the effort and time which institutional investors 
spend on monitoring firms as external monitors. However, there are endogeneity 
concerns about the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate actions 
(Boone and White 2015). It is not clear whether institutional ownership induces changes 
in CSR performance or instead migrates toward firms with better CSR performance. 
This study aims to provide new empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
institutional investors on CSR with a sample of listed firms in China, the largest 
emerging market in the world. To address the endogeneity concern caused by the 
possible two-way causality between institutional ownership and firms’ CSR 
engagement, we investigate how managers of Chinese listed firms adjust their CSR 
decisions when their institutional investors are distracted by exogenous attention-
grabbing events and are therefore inattentive to them. 
Attention is a scarce cognitive resource (Kahneman 1973) and has been 
documented to influence the decisions of both individual investors (Barber and Odean 
2008; Da et al. 2011; Da et al. 2014) and institutional investors (Lu et al. 2016; 
Kacperczyk et al. 2016; Ben-Rephael et al. 2017; Schmidt 2019). The monitoring 
capacity of institutional investors is scarce as a result of their limited attention (Kempf 
et al. 2017)2. When institutional investors pay more attention to certain stocks in their 
                            
2 According to Kempf et al. 2017, the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRC 2011) in America 
conducted a large-scale survey in 2011 and stated that “three-fourths of institutions report that time is the most 
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portfolios, they have to simultaneously pay less attention to and thus reduce their 
monitoring intensity at others. We borrow the example in Kempf et al. (2017) to 
illustrate this idea more explicitly. Consider institutional investor j who holds two 
stocks, firm i and the other firm belonging to a different industry which we call “banks.” 
Suppose now that there is an attention-grabbing event in the banking industry; for 
instance, a banking crisis that sends prices of bank stocks falling. Assuming limited 
attention, institutional investor j rationally shifts attention towards banks and away from 
firm i. As a result, monitoring intensity at firm i decreases, and the management of firm 
i has more room to pursue private benefits. Since firm i is not from the banking industry, 
the reduction in monitoring intensity at firm i is exogenous.  
Therefore, by observing how managers of Chinese listed firms adjust their CSR 
decisions to respond to the exogenous variation of institutional investors’ monitoring 
intensity, we can establish the causality between firms’ institutional investors and their 
CSR engagements without the concern of endogeneity issues. Specifically, a positive 
relationship between institutional investor inattention and CSR indicates that managers 
invest more in CSR when they are less monitored, supporting the notion that CSR is 
beneficial to managers instead of shareholders. In contrast, a negative relationship 
between institutional investor inattention and CSR indicates that managers invest less 
in CSR when they are less urged by institutional investors to do so, supporting the 
notion that CSR is beneficial to shareholders, including institutional investors.  
To empirically study the abovementioned predictions, we collect a sample of 
                            
common impediment to engagement [with corporations], while staffing considerations rank second.” 
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Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2017. We measure firms’ CSR engagement with their 
CSR scores issued by the Running and Loving Consulting for Common Welfare Co.Ltd  
(RKS for short).3 RKS is an independent third-party rating agency that follows the 
framework of the U.S. social investment rating agency Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & 
Co., Inc. (KLD). Every year, RKS evaluates CSR activities of Chinese public firms and 
assigns CSR scores to them based on their self-disclosed CSR reports. This evaluation 
system contains about 70 indicators that refer to the standards of the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI3.0) and ISO26000 (Guidance on Social Responsibility) but are adapted 
to China-specific CSR elements. The validity of RKS CSR scores was verified by 
Marquis and Qian (2014). RKS CSR scores are commonly used in prior studies on CSR 
activities in China (Marquis and Qian 2014; Lau et al. 2016; Gong et al. 2018; Zhang 
et al. 2018).  
Meanwhile, we proxy for firm-level institutional investor inattention following 
Kempf et al. (2017). Our empirical results show that institutional investor inattention is 
significantly and negatively related to CSR after controlling for ownership structure, 
board structure, and other firm characteristics. This negative relationship is robust when 
we use alternative CSR proxies, when firm fixed effects are included in order to address 
the concern of omitted variables and when inattention proxies are one or two quarters 
lagged. Additionally, we find that institutional investors visit firms less when they are 
more inattentive to these firms, suggesting that they indeed loosen their monitoring 
intensity at firms when they are distracted. Therefore, the negative relationship 
                            
3 http://www.rksratings.cn/. 
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indicates that managers invest less in CSR when they are less monitored and thus less 
motivated to maximize shareholder wealth, supporting the notion that CSR is beneficial 
to shareholders of Chinese listed firms and that principal-agent conflicts between 
managers and shareholders, including institutional investors, contribute to the 
abovementioned negative relationship4. 
Consistent with this argument, we find that the negative relationship between 
institutional investor inattention and CSR exists only in firms with relatively high 
expense ratios5, low managerial ownership, low internal control quality, and low analyst 
coverage, i.e., firms with larger principal-agent costs or weaker corporate governance 
mechanisms that mitigate principal-agent problems. Also, the negative relationship is 
more attributable to the inattention of institutional investors with more monitoring 
incentives, that is, institutional investors with influential share fractions and/or long-
term investment horizons (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Sandberg 2013) and dedicated 
institutional investors and quasi-indexers that are documented by prior studies as active 
market monitors (Appel et al. 2016; Borochin and Yang 2017). 
We may make several contributions to the literature. First, we enrich the literature 
on the ongoing debate on whether CSR engagement is initiated by managers’ self-
interested behaviors or is helpful in creating firm value for shareholders (Tirole 2001; 
Lins et al. 2017). We find that managers reduce CSR engagement when they are paid 
less attention and are thus less monitored by institutional investors. This effect is more 
                            
4 There is a rich literature documenting that agent problems are rampant in China (Allen et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 
2010; He and Luo 2018). 
5 As discussed later, the expense ratio, which is the operating expenses scaled by annual sales, is widely used to 
measure firms’ agency costs caused by principal-agent problems (Ang et al. 2000; Fauver and Fuerst 2006; Jiang et 
al. 2015).  
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pronounced for firms with more serious principal-agent problems and is more 
attributable to the inattention of institutional investors with more monitoring incentives. 
These findings suggest that shareholders of Chinese listed firms such as institutional 
investors demand CSR engagement, which in turn indicates that CSR is beneficial to 
shareholders for Chinese listed firms. Our findings are consistent with Wang and Li 
(2016), who show that CSR initiators in China have higher market valuations than 
matched CSR non-initiators, and Gong et al. (2018), who document that high CSR 
performance lowers corporate bond costs. 
Second, we extend the literature on limited attention in behavioral finance. 
Although investor attention is found to be influential on information dissemination and 
asset pricing by a rich stream of literature, the study on its impact on corporate decisions 
is relatively limited (Baker and Wurgler 2013; Kempf et al. 2017). While Kempf et al. 
(2017) study the impact of institutional investor inattention on corporate operating 
actions such as acquisitions and CEO stock option grants, we investigate its impact on 
managers’ CSR engagement, which is discretionary for most Chinese firms (Yin and 
Zhang 2012) and is not directly related to firms’ operating performance. Compared to 
routine daily operation decisions, managers have more discretion to engage in CSR 
activities and thus are more likely to adjust CSR decisions in responding to the variation 
in their institutional investors’ monitoring. Similar to Kempf et al. (2017), the negative 
relationship between institutional investor inattention and CSR in our study suggests 
that managers tend to maximize their own benefits instead of shareholder wealth when 
their institutional investors temporarily supply sub-optimal monitoring capacity as a 
8 
 
result of exogenous attention-grabbing events. Specifically, our study suggests that the 
potential positive impact of institutional investors on CSR engagement might be 
constrained by their limited attention. 
Third, we enrich the literature regarding the impact of institutional investors on 
CSR by providing new empirical evidence for listed firms in China, the largest 
emerging market in the world, while addressing the possible endogeneity concerns 
between institutional ownership and CSR. Among others, Lockett et al. (2006) call for 
more CSR studies in emerging markets where institutional background, culture, moral 
standards, and CSR awareness are quite different from those in developed markets 
where CSR studies have been primarily conducted. By extending the extant research to 
the context of China, we provide new insights into the relationship between institutional 
investors and CSR in emerging markets. Meanwhile, most prior studies illustrate the 
impact of institutional investors on CSR by showing the relationship between 
institutional ownership and CSR. However, this paradigm suffers from endogeneity 
concerns regarding a possible two-way causality. By studying how firms adjust CSR 
decisions when their institutional investors are distracted by exogenous attention-
grabbing events, our study is free from endogeneity concerns and thus offers 
meaningful insights for future studies in this field. 
The remainder of our study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
hypothesis development. Section 3 defines variable definitions and specifies empirical 
models. Section 4 reports summary statistics, Pearson correlation analysis, and 
regression results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
9 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
After the 2008 melamine contamination incident, both consumers and investors 
showed a high level of awareness and trust in CSR (Wang et al. 2011) and valued firms 
with good CSR records (Tian et al. 2011). For Chinese public firms, investors offer 
higher market valuations for CSR initiators than for matched non-initiators (Wang and 
Li 2016). Additionally, Chinese listed firms with higher CSR disclosure quality are 
associated with lower debt costs (Gong et al. 2018). In short, good CSR practices are 
helpful for increasing long-term firm value and shareholder wealth of Chinese public 
firms. Hence, institutional investors in the China A-share market may have a positive 
attitude regarding CSR engagement.  
By contrast, managers of Chinese public firms do not have as much incentive as 
do institutional investors to engage in CSR activities. Though growing, the sense of 
social responsibility is still relatively weak in China compared to western developed 
countries (Yin and Zhang 2012)6. Hence, managers would not obtain as many private 
benefits such as good reputation from firms’ engagement as do their peers in western 
countries. Also, managers would not be punished or condemned if they do not make 
good CSR practices since it is not common for every Chinese public firm to engage in 
CSR7. Managers of Chinese firms do not have personal values that make them believe 
that CSR is important, either (Shafer et al. 2007).  
In summary, managers of Chinese firms are not likely to initiate CSR activities for 
                            
6 According to a survey reported in the China Sustainable Investment Review 2019, 89% of the respondents said 
that they are not familiar with environmental, social and governance (ESG) investment, and 44% of them have never 
heard about “green investment”, “social responsibility investment” or “ESG”. See 
http://f.sinaimg.cn/client/ebe07d0f/20191205/ChinaSIF2019.pdf  
7 For instance, approximately 43% of Chinese listed firms do not even disclose CSR reports in our sample period. 
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self-interested purposes. Meanwhile, there are severe principal-agent problems in 
Chinses public firms. Therefore, managers are not motivated to make good CSR 
practices to create firm value for shareholders unless they are well monitored by 
institutional investors among other corporate mechanisms.  
Naturally, to monitor managers’ CSR engagement, institutional investors should 
carefully pay attention to managers. However, as a scarce cognitive resource, attention 
is not unlimited even for institutional investors (Ben-Rephael et al. 2017; Lu et al. 2016). 
They must allocate their limited attention across hundreds of stocks in their portfolios. 
When institutional investors are distracted by exogenous attention-grabbing events, 
they loosen their monitoring intensity on managers as a result of their limited attention 
(Kempf et al. 2017). Aware of being less monitored, managers are more likely to 
maximize their private benefits than to create firm value for shareholders through CSR 
engagement. Thus, managers will engage less in CSR when they are paid to less 
attention and are thus less monitored by institutional investors. Our hypothesis H1 is 
thus stated as follows: 
H1: Institutional investor inattention is significantly and negatively related to 
firms’ CSR engagement.  
To test the robustness of the negative relationship between institutional investor 
inattention and CSR, we then investigate the cross-sectional differences in the negative 
relationship. We argue that managers reduce CSR engagement when they are paid to 
less attention by institutional investors and hence are less motivated to create firm value 
through CSR. Thus, the negative relationship is attributable to the principal-agent 
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problem between managers and shareholders, including institutional investors. If so, 
the negative relationship should be more pronounced for firms with more serious 
principal-agent problems or weaker corporate governance mechanisms that mitigate 
principal-agent problems. 
Specifically, we expect that this relationship is more pronounced for firms with 
higher expense ratios, less managerial ownership, weaker internal controls, and less 
analyst coverage. According to Ang et al. (2000), excessive expense on perks and other 
nonessentials is reflected in the operating expenses. Therefore, the expense ratio, which 
is operating expense scaled by annual sales, is a measure of firm-level direct agency 
costs including shirking and excessive perquisite consumption by managers. Higher 
operating expense to sales ratios indicates more excessive perquisite consumption and 
thus higher agency costs. The expense ratio is used to measure agency costs caused by 
principal-agent problems in prior studies (Fauver and Fuerst 2006; Jiang et al. 2015). 
In addition, managerial ownership is designed to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders and hence helps mitigate the principal-agent problem, while internal 
controls and analyst coverage are documented by a large body of literature as internal 
and external governance mechanisms that mitigate agency problems (Goh and Li 2011; 
Adhikari 2016). Therefore, our hypothesis H2 is stated as follows: 
H2: The negative relationship between institutional investor inattention and 
CSR is more pronounced for firms with higher expense ratios, less managerial 
ownership, weaker internal controls, and less analyst coverage. 
Similarly, if the negative relationship between institutional investor inattention and 
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CSR is caused by the principal-agent problem, the inattention of institutional investors 
with more monitoring incentives would cause a larger decrease in monitoring intensity 
and thus a larger negative impact on CSR. To study this prediction, we categorize 
institutional investors into different groups with different potential monitoring 
incentives and investigate whether institutional investors in different groups exhibit 
different impacts on firms’ CSR engagement. 
First, we group institutional investors according to their institution types. 
Institutional investors in China’s A-share market are classified into ten major institution 
types8. The fraction of ownership and investment horizons differ considerably across 
institution types9. Aggarwal et al. (2011) show that both the monitoring incentives and 
the monitoring power of institutional investors are largely determined by their fractions 
of firm shares. Therefore, naturally, the inattention of institutional investors with larger 
ownership is likely to have a larger impact on firms’ CSR engagement. Meanwhile, 
institutional investors with longer investment horizons are associated with more 
monitoring incentives (Appel et al. 2016). They are more likely to promote firms’ CSR 
engagement to minimize external costs caused by poor social or environmental 
performances (Cox et al. 2004; Sandberg 2013). The review in Faller & Knyphausen-
Aufsess (2018) also concludes that long-term institutional investors show a more 
positive attitude regarding CSR than do short-term institutional investors. Hence, long-
                            
8 Namely, these types are insurance companies, public mutual funds, the national social security fund, exchange-
traded funds, overseas institutional investors, corporate annuity plans, banks, trust companies, brokerage firms, and 
private investment funds.  
9
 As discussed later in section 4.4.1, insurance companies, mutual funds, and the national security fund are the three 
largest institutional investors in the Chinese A-share market. The institutional ownership of other institutional 
investors is relatively minor. 
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term institutional investors are more likely to urge managers to engage in CSR activities. 
Correspondingly, the distraction of long-term institutional investors is likely to show a 
larger impact on managers’ CSR engagement. Therefore, we present our hypothesis 
H3a as follows: 
H3a: The negative relationship between institutional investor inattention and 
CSR is more attributable to institutions with influential ownership and/or long 
investment horizons.  
Second, we identify institutional investors’ monitoring incentives by their 
portfolio holdings and investment styles following Bushee (1998) and Bushee and Noe 
(2000). Bushee (1998) and Bushee and Noe (2000) classify institutional investors into 
dedicated institutional investors, transient institutional investors, and quasi-indexers 
based on their portfolio concentrations, portfolio turnover, and trading strategies. 
Dedicated institutional investors, which are associated with high portfolio 
concentration, low portfolio turnover and low trading sensitivity to current earnings, 
have strong incentives and power to actively engage in corporate governance activities 
to benefit from the increase in long-term firm value (Borochin and Yang 2017). Quasi-
indexers usually own highly diversified portfolios and follow a buy-and-hold 
investment strategy. Quasi-indexers are also active corporate monitors because the 
improvement of corporate governance helps improve stock liquidity and reduce the 
transaction cost, which is vital for quasi-indexers’ investment returns due to their 
passive investment strategy (Bird and Karolyi 2016). In contrast, transient institutional 
investors, which have high portfolio turnover and prefer short-term market benefits, 
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show relatively weak interest in corporate governance (Boone and White 2015). Our 
hypothesis H3b is thus stated as follows: 
H3b: The negative relationship between institutional investor inattention and 
CSR is more attributable to dedicated institutional investors and quasi-indexers. 
3. Research design 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
We use a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2017, as our CSR data are 
available since 2009. We obtain CSR data for Chinese listed firms from Running and 
Loving Consulting for Common Welfare Co. Ltd, or RKS for short. Since 2009, RKS 
has collected CSR data from CSR disclosure reports of Chinese listed firms and 
evaluated these reports with both scores and rates. We obtain data regarding the 
portfolios of institutional investors from Wind, a professional financial data provider in 
China. Data regarding stock returns, firm financial information, ownership structure, 
board structure, and other firm characteristics are obtained from the China Stock Market 
& Accounting Research database (CSMAR). After deleting firms in the financial 
industry and firms with missing control variables, we obtain a sample of 12,556 firm-
year observations. To mitigate the impact of outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 CSR proxies 
Following prior studies on CSR in China (Marquis and Qian 2014; Lau et al. 2016; 
Gong et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018), we use RKS CSR scores to construct proxies for 
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the CSR engagement of our sample firms. Since 2009, RKS annually reviews self-
disclosed CSR reports of Chinese public firms and evaluates their CSR activities with 
about 70 indicators. As mentioned in the introduction section, these indicators follow 
the framework of KLD and refer to the standards of GRI3.0 and ISO26000, but are 
adapted to China-specific CSR elements. These indicators were classified into three 
dimensions before 2011. The first dimension is “Macrocosm” with indicators about 
firms’ CSR strategy, corporate governance, and stakeholder participation. The second 
dimension is “Content” with indicators about firms’ economic performance, 
employment and human rights, environmental performances, fairness in operation, 
customer protection, and community participation and development. The third 
dimension is “Technique” with indicators about the content balance, comparability, 
innovativeness, creditability and transparency, normalization, availability and 
information communication efficiency of firms’ CSR reports. Since 2011, the fourth 
dimension, “Industry”, was added to RKS CSR scores. Criteria for rating CSR 
engagement in the “Industry” dimension varies across industries. For instance, RKS 
uses ecological environment and management indicators to evaluate CSR engagement 
for firms in the mining industry and construction waste discharge indicators for firms 
in the real estate industry. The RKS CSR score of firm i in year t (denoted as Scorei,t) 
is then formulated by aggregating the scores of these four dimensions. RKS CSR scores 
range from 0 to 100. For the year 2009 and 2010, Macrocosm (Mi,t), Content (Ci,t) and 
Technique (Ti,t) have a weight of 30%, 50%, and 20%, respectively. Thus, Mi,t ranges 
from 0 to 30, et cetera. Since 2011, the weight is 30% for Mi,t, 45% for Ci,t, 15% for Ti,t, 
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and 10% for industry (Ii,t). By definition, a higher RKS score indicates more CSR 
engagement and better CSR performance.  
RKS relies on self-disclosed CSR reports of Chinese public firms to grade their 
CSR engagement. Constituent stocks of the Shenzhen 100 Index and Shanghai 
Corporate Governance Index, firms in the finance industry and firms cross-listed on 
overseas stock exchanges are mandated to disclose annual CSR reports, while other 
firms are discretionary to disclose their CSR reports. We use both firms that are 
mandated to disclose CSR reports and firms that are discretionary to do so as sample 
firms. The former firms and the latter firms provide about 26% and 74% of observations 
in our sample, respectively. For the latter firms, on average, about 57% (43%) of them 
choose (choose not) to disclose CSR reports. Following Gong et al. (2018), we assign 
Scorei,t , Mi,t , Ci,t, Ti,t and Ii,t a value of zero if firm i does not disclose a CSR report in 
year t. 
3.2.2 Institutional investor inattention 
We follow Kempf et al. (2017) and construct a firm-level institutional investor 
inattention proxy based on exogenous attention-distracting events, or extreme industry 
returns to be specific. The intuition behind this proxy is described as follows. Assume 
that institutional investor j holds shares of two firms (denoted as Firm i and Firm f) in 
two different industry sectors by the end of quarter q-1. In quarter q, the industry sector 
to which Firm f belongs has the highest or lowest return among all industry sectors. 
Thus, Firm f experiences an extreme industry return and thus is attention-grabbing 
(Barber and Odean 2008). Institutional investor j would be attracted by the extreme 
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industry return and pay more attention to Firm f, and simultaneously pay less attention 
to Firm i due to his/her attention constraint. Thus, institutional investor j reduce his/her 
monitoring intensity on firm i because he/she is distracted by the attention-grabbing 
event of firm f. Since Firm i and Firm f are from different industries, the decrease in 
monitoring intensity on firm i is reasonably assumed to be exogenous. The distraction 
effect of institutional investor j on firm i depends on the weight of firm f in its stock 
portfolio and its ownership in firm i. The former indicates how important firm f is to 
institutional investor j and the latter indicates how influential institutional investor j is 
to firm i. Based on this idea, an inattention score of investor j to firm i is computed. By 
aggregating inattention scores of all firm i’s institutional investors with the model (1), 
we then obtain firm i’s institutional investor inattention level in quarter q (InAtti,q). 
1
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j denotes institutional investor j of firm i, and nq-1 denotes the set of firm i’s 
institutional investors by the end of quarter q-1. IN
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industry sector IN has the highest or lowest return across all industry sectors in quarter 
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(2) 
IOi,j,q-1 is the percentage of firm i’s shares held by institutional investor j, and 
PWi,j,q-1 is the weight of firm i in investor j’s portfolio. We then sort IO i,j,q-1 and PWi,j,q-
1 into quintiles (denoted as QIOi,j,q-1 and QPWi,j,q-1) to minimize the impact of outliers 
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and the measurement error following Kempf et al. (2017). We scale the sum of QIOi,j,q-
1 and QPWi,j,q-1 by the denominator so that the sum of , , 1i j qw   equals 1. Finally, we 
aggregate InAtti,q in a given year to obtain the firm-year institutional investor inattention 
(InAtti,t).  
It’s reasonable to argue that InAtti,q is valid only if institutional investors engage in 
multiple industries and do not have the capacities to follow the industries in parallel, 
and the distraction is enduring for a long time period as well. We believe these 
requirements are satisfied in our study. There is a growing literature documenting that 
institutional investors suffer from limited attention (Lu et al. 2016; Kacperczyk et al. 
2016; Ben-Rephael et al. 2017; Kempf et al. 2017). In our sample, on average, an 
institutional investor holds 76.54 stocks from 9.18 industries10. These figures support 
that institutional investors are indeed engaged in multiple industries. Besides, economic 
fundamentals underlying distraction events are complicated, and these events take time 
to unfold and to be understood. Even short but unanticipated events such as natural 
disasters, court rulings or new legislation may take time to fully understand the impact. 
Therefore, the distraction events can have a prolonged impact on monitoring capacity 
that would be relevant for managerial actions11. 
Kempf et al. (2017) provide evidence that this inattention proxy properly measures 
firms’ institutional monitoring intensity by showing that it is significantly and 
negatively related to institutional investors’ participation in firms’ conference calls and 
                            
10 We follow the industry classifications issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2012 
and classify stocks into 19 industries. 
11 See section 2.2 in Kempf et al. (2017) for a detailed discussion on this. 
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shareholder proposals. As discussed later in section 4.2.5, we find this proxy is 
significantly and negatively related to the frequency on which firms’ institutional 
investors pay visits to them, indicating it’s also valid for the Chinese context.  
3.2.3 Model specification 
Our baseline model is specified in the model (3): 
, 1 , ,i t i t i tCSR InAtt Control       (3) 
CSRi,t is the proxy for firm i’s CSR engagement, such as the total RKS CSR scores 
and the four sub-category scores in year t. InAtti,t is calculated with the model (2) 
following Kempf et al. (2017). Control stands for the set of control variables. Following 
prior studies (Ferrell et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2018), we control a set of variables related 
to firm characteristics, internal governance mechanisms, and external governance 
mechanisms. To be more specific, we first control for firm characteristics, including 
firm size (Sizei,t), the book-to-market ratio (BMi,t), financial leverage (Levi,t), return on 
assets (ROAi,t), capital expenditure (Capexi,t), analyst coverage (ACi,t) and the indicator 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEi,t). Second, we control for a set of ownership structure 
variables, including institutional ownership (IOi,t), managerial ownership (MOi,t), the 
share percentage of the largest shareholder (TOP1i,t) and the ownership concentration 
of the top 5 shareholders (HHI5i,t). Finally, we control for a set of board structure 
variables including board size (BSizei,t), board independence (BIndepi,t) and CEO 
duality (Dualityi,t). Detailed definitions of all variables used in this study are provided 
in the Appendix. 
4. Empirical results 
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4.1 Summary statistics 
We summarize descriptive statistics regarding the main variables used in this study 
in Table 1. The mean of InAtti,t is 0.0574 and is smaller than that (0.16) in Kempf et al. 
(2017). The reason for this difference is straightforward. The mean institutional 
ownership for sample firms in this study is 18.05%, while that in Kempf et al. (2017) 
is approximately 43%. Nevertheless, the standard deviation of InAtti,t is 0.0900 and is 
comparable to that (0.07) in Kempf et al. (2017). The mean of Scorei,t is 21.9686 and is 
quite close to that (19.47) in Gong et al. (2018). On average, macrocosm (M), content 
(C), technique (T) and industry (I) contribute 7.2992, 9.5719, 3.8109 and 1.0937 scores 
to Scorei,t, respectively. With respect to firm characteristics, the average book-to-market 
ratio (BMi,t), return on assets (ROAi,t) and financial leverage (Levi,t) are 0.9247, 4.45% 
and 46.29%, respectively. In total, 47.23% of sample firms are state-owned (SOEi,t). In 
addition, on average, managers hold 5.37% of firm shares (MOi,t), while the first top 
shareholder owns 35.26% of firm shares. 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the Pearson correlations of the variables. Consistent 
with our hypothesis H1, Scorei,t is negatively correlated with InAttit. The correlations 
between Scorei,t and firm characteristics are also informative. For example, Scorei,t is 
positively correlated with analyst coverage, institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, and board independence and is negatively related to top 5 ownership 
concentration and board size. These correlations support that better internal or external 
corporate governance induces more CSR engagement for Chinese listed firms. 
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Therefore, these correlations are consistent with our predictions that CSR is beneficial 
to shareholders for Chinese listed firms, and managers may reduce CSR engagement 
when they are less monitored by institutional investors and other governance 
mechanisms. In addition, as shown in Panel B, the correlation coefficients among 
control variables are generally low, and the variance inflation factors of all explanatory 
variables are far less than 10, indicating that our results are free from collinearity 
problems. 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
4.2 The impact of institutional investor inattention on CSR 
4.2.1 Baseline regression results 
The regression results of the model (3) are reported in Table 3. Total RKS CSR 
scores (Scorei,t), macrocosm scores (Mi,t), content scores (Ci,t), technique scores (Ti,t) 
and industry scores (Ii,t) are used as dependent variables in columns (1) to (5), 
respectively. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. T-statistics 
in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. For the convenience of interpretation, 
InAtti,t is standardized to have a zero mean and unit variance in all regressions. As 
shown in column (1), InAtti,t is negatively related to Scorei,t with a significance level of 
5% (t-statistics=-1.99). The coefficient of InAtti,t (-0.554) indicates that a one-unit 
increase in InAtti,t would lead to a decrease of Scorei,t by 0.554. Quite similar results 
are inferred when CSR scores in each subcategory (M, C, T, and I) are used as 
dependent variables. M, C, and I are negatively related to Scorei,t with a 5% significance 
level or higher. The coefficient of T is also negative but is statistically insignificant. 
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These findings indicate that the inattention of institutional investors affects CSR in a 
variety of aspects. Meanwhile, IOi,t is significantly and positively related to Scorei,t and 
the four subcategories of CSR scores. Overall, these findings suggest that although 
more institutional ownership could urge managers to invest more in CSR, managers 
reduce CSR engagement when institutional investors are inattentive to them, which is 
consistent with our hypothesis H1. 
The relationships among Scorei,t and control variables in Table 3 are similar to 
those shown in the correlation matrix in Table 2. Scorei,t is higher for firms with more 
analyst coverage, less ownership of the largest shareholder, larger managerial 
ownership, and more board independence and for firms for which the CEO does not 
chair the board, i.e., firms that are associated with stronger internal or external 
governance. Along with the negative relationship between InAtti,t and Scorei,t, it is 
concluded that for Chinese listed firms, managers are less motivated to engage in CSR 
activities when they are less monitored by institutional investors and other corporate 
governance mechanisms. In addition, Scorei,t is higher for firms with larger sizes, higher 
book-to-market ratios, lower financial leverage, more capital expenditure and SOEs. 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
4.2.2 Alternative CSR proxies 
To check the robustness of the relationship between InAtti,t and Scorei,t, we use 
alternative CSR proxies and repeat the regressions with the model (3). First, following 
Zhang et al. (2018), we alternatively measure CSR engagement with a dummy 
indicating whether a firm chooses to disclose CSR reports in a given year. To be more 
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specific, we exclude from our sample firms that are mandated to disclose CSR reports 
and then define DDisi,t as 1 if firm i voluntarily discloses its CSR report in year t and 0 
otherwise. The mean of DDisi,t is 0.5727, which indicates that on average, 
approximately 43% of Chinese listed firms choose not to disclose CSR reports in our 
sample period. 
We then run logit regressions on the model (3) with DDisi,t as the dependent 
variable and report the regression results in column (1) of Table 4. InAtti,t is negatively 
related to DDisi,t at a significance level of 5% (t-statistic=-2.33), suggesting that 
managers are more likely to choose not to disclose CSR reports when institutional 
investors are more inattentive to them. Compared with firms with good CSR 
performance, firms with poor CSR performance are naturally less likely to voluntarily 
disclose their CSR reports. Therefore, this finding supports the robustness of the 
negative relationship between institutional investor inattention and CSR engagement 
shown in Table 3. 
We also alternatively measure CSR engagement with firms’ CSR scores issued by 
an alternative financial media, i.e., the hexun.com (HX hereafter). HX is a leading 
internet financial media firm in China and began to issue CSR scores for Chinese listed 
firms in 2010. Similar to RKS CSR scores, HX CSR scores are also based on CSR 
disclosure reports of Chinese listed firms. Unlike RKS CSR scores, HX establishes five 
subcategories of CSR scores, including scores for shareholder responsibility, employee 
responsibility, customer responsibility, environmental responsibility, and social 
responsibility. We denote HX CSR scores and the five subcategories of CSR scores as 
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HXScorei,t, SHolderi,t, Employeei,t, Customeri,t, Enviri,t and Sociali,t, respectively. We 
then use them as dependent variables in the model (3) and report the regression results 
in columns (2) to (6) of Table 4. InAtti,t is negatively related to HXScorei,t, Employeei,t, 
Customeri,t and Enviri,t with a 10% or higher significance level. Both SHolderi,t and 
Sociali,t are insignificantly related to InAtti,t. The results in columns (2) to (6) of Table 
4 suggest that InAtti,t has a significant and negative impact on firms’ overall CSR 
engagement and on a variety of CSR aspects. These findings again support the 
robustness of the negative relationship between institutional investor inattention and 
CSR engagement, as stated by hypothesis H1. 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
4.2.3 The concern on omitted variables 
There is a rich body of literature on the factors of firms’ CSR decisions. Although 
we add a set of common factors as control variables in our model, it is still possible that 
we omit important variables. To address this concern, we add firm fixed effects to the 
regressions. In addition, we use the first-order difference of RKS’s CSR scores and the 
four sub-categories of scores as dependent variables of the model (3). We report these 
regression results in Table 5. As shown in Table 5, although a large number of control 
variables become insignificant, the coefficients of InAtti,t remain significantly negative 
in columns (1), (2) and (3). Larger institutional investor inattention causes a 
significantly greater decrease in macrocosm scores (M), content scores (C) and total 
CSR scores. Again, these findings suggest a robust negative relationship between 
institutional investor inattention and CSR engagement. 
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< Insert Table 5 about here > 
4.2.4 Lagged institutional investor inattention proxies 
In baseline model regressions, we regress firms’ CSR proxies of year t on their 
institutional investor inattention proxies of the same year. However, managers may take 
time to adjust their CSR decisions after they sense that they are less monitored. 
Therefore, the actual impact of institutional investor inattention may exhibit with time 
lags. Therefore, in this section, we lag our inattention proxies for one or two quarters 
and run the empirical tests again as robustness tests. That is, we study how firms’ 
institutional investor inattention affects firms’ CSR engagement in the future one or two 
quarters.  
Specifically, for firm i, we calculate its institutional investor inattention proxies in 
quarter 4 of year t-1, and quarters 1, 2 and 3 of year t. We then aggregate these four 
inattention proxies to obtain 1,
q
i tInAtt  , the one quarter lagged institutional investor 
inattention proxy of firm i in year t. We then replace ,i tInAtt with
1
,
q
i tInAtt in the baseline 
model and run regressions again. Regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. 
1
,
q
i tInAtt  is significantly and negatively related to Scorei,t, Mi,t, Ci,t and Ii,t just as is ,i tInAtt  
in Table 3. We reach quite similar findings when we lagged institutional investor 
inattention proxy with two quarters in Panel B of Table 6. These results support the 
robustness of our argument regarding the impact of institutional investor inattention on 
frims’ CSR decisions.  
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
4.2.5 Institutional investor inattention and monitoring intensity 
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Based on the findings of Kempf et al. (2017), we assume that institutional investors’ 
inattention level is inversely related to their monitoring intensity. Therefore, we argue 
that the negative relationship between institutional investor inattention and CSR 
indicates that managers are less motivated to create firm value through CSR when they 
are less monitored by institutional investors. Our argument holds only if the 
abovementioned assumption holds. To test this assumption and therefore check the 
robustness of our argument, we investigate whether institutional investors loosen their 
monitoring intensity on firms when they are inattentive. Specifically, we study the 
impact of institutional investor inattention on the possibility and frequency at which 
firms are visited by their institutional investors. Recent studies show that site visits offer 
visitors such as institutional investors opportunities to meet managers privately and 
express their concerns (Han et al. 2018; Cheng et al. 2019). Therefore, if institutional 
investors loosen their monitoring intensity on firms when they are inattentive, they will 
visit these firms less. 
To test this prediction empirically, we follow Han et al. (2018) and Cheng et al. 
(2019) to construct the determinant model of visits, which is shown in model (4). 
, 1 , ,i t i t i tVisit InAtt Control       (4) 
Visiti,t is proxied by either DVisiti,t or NVisiti,t. DVisiti,t equals 1 if firm i is visited 
at least once by institutional investors in year t and equals 0 otherwise. NVisiti,t is the 
natural logarithm of 1 plus the times that firm i is visited by institutional investors in 
year t. Because only firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China are 
mandated to disclose site visit events, we use only SZSE firms as sample firms in the 
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model (4)12. The variable of interest in the model (4) is InAtti,t. We expect a significantly 
negative 
1 , which indicates that institutional investors visit firms less and loosen their 
monitoring intensity when they are more inattentive. The other explanatory variables in 
the model (4) are borrowed from Han et al. (2018) and Cheng et al. (2019). DManui,t 
equals 1 if firm i is in the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise. DRatei,t equals 1 if 
the information disclosure quality of firm i is relatively poor and hence is rated as C or 
D by the SZSE and equals 0 otherwise. Reti,t is the market-adjusted stock return of firm 
i in year t. Agei,t is the natural logarithm of years for which firm i has been listed on the 
SZSE. MSharei,t is the market share of firm i in year t. NFirmsi,t is the natural logarithm 
of the total number of listed firms in the city where firm i is headquartered, while 
GDPGrowthi,t is the GDP growth of the city where firm i is headquartered. All variables 
are defined in the appendix. 
We report the regression results of the model (4) in Table 7. DVisiti,t is used as the 
dependent variable in column (1), and NVisiti,t is used as the dependent variable in 
column (2). As expected, InAtti,t is negatively related to both DVisiti,t and NVisiti,t with 
a significance level of 5%, indicating that institutional investors visit firms less when 
they are more inattentive. These findings support our assumption that the inattention 
level of institutional investors is inversely related to their monitoring intensity. 
Therefore, these findings also support our argument that managers are less motivated 
to create firm value for shareholders through CSR when they are paid less attention and 
                            
12 There are two stock exchanges in China, that is, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. Firms listed on SSE are not required to disclose site visit events. Please see Cheng et al. (2016b), Han et 
al. (2018) and Cheng et al. (2019) for details regarding the institution background of site visits in the Chinese A-
share market. 
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are less monitored. 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
4.3 Sub-sample analyses based on firm characteristics 
As stated in the development of hypothesis H2, we expect the negative relationship 
between institutional investor inattention and CSR to be more pronounced for firms 
with more serious principal-agent problems. To test hypothesis H2, first, we investigate 
whether the abovementioned negative relationship is more pronounced for firms with 
high expense ratios and hence high agency costs (Ang et al. 2000). To do so, we divide 
our sample into two sub-samples. A firm-year observation is classified into the high 
agency cost sub-sample if its expense ratio is above the sample median in a given year; 
otherwise, it is classified into the sub-sample of low agency costs. We then re-estimate 
the model (3) with the two sub-samples. The regression results are reported in columns 
(1) and (2) in Panel A of Table 8. InAtti,t is negatively related to Scorei,t in both columns 
(1) and (2) but is only statistically significant in column (1), where the sub-sample of 
high agency costs is used in the regressions. These findings indicate that the negative 
relationship between institutional investors exists only when a firm has relatively high 
agency costs, which is consistent with hypothesis H2. 
Second, we investigate whether the negative relationship is more pronounced for 
firms with less managerial ownership. Both Cheng et al. (2016a) and Masulis and Reza 
(2015) argue that spending on CSR in the United States is due partly to agency problems 
by showing the reverse relationship between CSR and managerial ownership. Similarly, 
if the negative relationship between InAtti,t and Scorei,t is caused by agency problems, 
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managers holding more firm shares should be less affected by the decreased monitoring 
intensity of institutional investors and hence be less likely to reduce CSR engagement. 
To investigate this possibility empirically, we divided our sample into two sub-samples 
based on managerial ownership. A firm-year observation is classified into the sub-
sample of high managerial ownership if its managerial ownership is above the sample 
median in a given year; otherwise, it is classified into the sub-sample of low managerial 
ownership. Regression results with these sub-samples are reported in columns (3) and 
(4) in Panel B of Table 8. InAtti,t is insignificantly and positively related to Scorei,t for 
the sub-sample of high managerial ownership in column (3). In contrast, InAtti,t is 
negatively related to Scorei,t with a significance level of 5% for the sub-sample of low 
managerial ownership in column (4). These findings support our hypothesis H2 and 
suggest that the negative relationship is more pronounced for firms with lower 
managerial ownership. These findings are also consistent with Jia and Zhang (2013), 
who document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and CSR for 
Chinese firms. 
< Insert Table 8 about here> 
Third, we investigate the impact of internal control quality on the negative 
relationship. We expect that, as important internal governance mechanisms, strong 
internal controls would mitigate the impact of the decreased monitoring intensity of 
institutional investors on managers’ CSR decisions. We measure firms’ internal control 
quality with their DIB internal control index values obtained from the DIB internal 
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control and risk management firms in China13 . Constructed from five perspectives, 
namely, the internal environment, risk evaluation, control activities, information and 
communication, and internal monitoring, the DIB internal control index is widely used 
in studies related to the internal controls of Chinese listed firms (Lu and Cao 2018; 
Wang et al. 2018). We classify a firm-year observation into the sub-sample of high 
internal control quality if its DIB internal control index value is above the sample 
median in a given year; otherwise, we classify it into the sub-sample of low internal 
control quality. Panel A of Table 9 reports the regression results of the model (3) with 
the two sub-samples. The coefficient of InAtti,t is positive and statistically insignificant 
for the sub-sample of high internal control quality and is significantly negative for the 
sub-sample of low internal control quality. Again, this finding is consistent with 
hypothesis H2, which states that the negative relationship between institutional investor 
inattention and CSR is more pronounced with lower internal control quality. 
Finally, we investigate the impact of analyst coverage on the negative relationship. 
Analyst coverage serves as an external governance mechanism and therefore affects 
managers’ CSR decisions (Adhikari 2016). Therefore, as stated in hypothesis H2, we 
expect the negative relationship to be more pronounced for firms with less analyst 
coverage. Again, we divided our sample into two sub-samples and studied the 
relationship between InAtti,t and Scorei,t. Firms are classified into the high analyst 
coverage sub-sample if their analyst coverage is above the sample median and 
otherwise are classified into the low analyst coverage sub-sample. In column (3) of 
                            
13 http://www.ic-erm.com/pro2.html 
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Table 9, where the high analyst coverage sub-sample is studied, InAtti,t is only 
insignificantly related to Scorei,t. In contrast, InAtti,t is negatively related to Scorei,t with 
a significance level of 10% (t-statistics=-1.94) in column (4), where the sub-sample of 
low analyst coverage is studied. These findings again support our hypothesis H2. 
To summarize, the sub-sample analysis in Table 8 and Table 9 suggests that, as 
expected by hypothesis H2, the significant negative relationship between institutional 
investor inattention and CSR is more pronounced for firms with higher expense ratios, 
less managerial ownership, weaker internal control, and less analyst coverage. 
< Insert Table 9 about here> 
4.4 The impact of different groups of institutional investors 
4.4.1 Institutional investors grouped by institution type 
To test H3a, we classify institutional investors into ten groups according to their 
institution types, namely, insurance companies, public mutual funds, the national social 
security fund, exchange-traded funds, overseas institutional investors 14 , corporate 
annuity plans, banks, trust companies, brokerage firms, and private investment funds. 
We calculate the yearly inattention of each institutional investor with the model (1) and 
aggregate them at institution group-firm level (denoted as 
,
n
i tInAttI , n=1,2,…,10). We 
then regress Scorei,t on ,
n
i tInAttI  separately and report the regression results in columns 
(1) to (10) in Table 10. 
,
n
i tInAttI  is significantly and negatively related to Scorei,t in 
columns (1), (2) and (3), where 
,
n
i tInAttI   proxies for the inattention of insurance 
                            
14 Overseas institutional investors in the Chinese A-share market include Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFII), RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII) and other overseas institutional investors that are 
able to trade stocks of Chinese A-share listed firms with the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program or the 
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect program. 
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companies, mutual funds, and the social security fund, respectively. In the remaining 
columns in Table 10, 
,
n
i tInAttI  is insignificantly related to Scorei,t. 
The institutional ownership of insurance companies, mutual funds, and the 
national social security fund rank in the top 3 among the ten types of institutional 
investors. They hold approximately 42%, 31% and 5% institutional ownership of 
Chinese A-share listed firms in our sample period, respectively15 . The institutional 
ownership of other institutions is relatively minor. Meanwhile, insurance companies 
and the national social security fund have relatively long investment horizons. The 
national security fund is run by a committee directly supervised by the Ministry of 
Finance of China and is supposed to provide financial support for nationwide social 
security needs. Therefore, the results in Table 10 are consistent with hypothesis H3a, 
which states that the negative relationship between institutional investor inattention and 
CSR is more strongly attributable to institutions with influential ownership and/or long 
investment horizons. Our findings are also consistent with Sandberg (2013), who argues 
that long-term investors demand high CSR engagement to minimize the external costs 
caused by poor social or environmental performances. 
< Insert Table 10 about here> 
4.4.2 Institutional investor groups classified by investment styles 
To test H3b, we follow Bushee (1998) and Bushee and Noe (2000) to classify 
institutional investors into dedicated institutional investors, transient institutional 
investors and quasi-indexers according to their portfolio concentration, portfolio 
                            
15 The national security fund is actually the largest single institutional investor in China. By the end of 2017, the 
market value of A-share stocks held by the national security fund was over 240 billion yuan (or 35 billion dollars). 
33 
 
turnover, and trading strategies. To be more specific, following Bushee (1998), we use 
four variables for portfolio concentration, two variables for portfolio turnover, and three 
variables regarding sensitivity to current earnings to describe the past investment 
behaviors of institutional investors16. We perform principal factor analysis to combine 
the nine variables into three common factors and then perform k-means cluster analysis 
on the factor scores to obtain the final separation of institutional investors. According 
to Bushee (1998), we then define institutional investors with high portfolio 
concentration, low portfolio turnover and low trading sensitivity to earnings as 
dedicated institutional investors based on their corresponding factor scores. Similarly, 
we define transient institutional investors as those with the highest portfolio turnover 
and the highest use of momentum strategies and define quasi-indexers as those 
exhibiting buy-and-hold trading strategies. 
We then measure the inattention of dedicated institutional investors, transient 
institutional investors, and quasi-indexers and denote them as InAttDi,t, InAttTi,t and 
InAttQi,t, respectively. We regress Scorei,t on InAttDi,t, InAttTi,t and InAttQi,t and report 
regression results in Table 11. As shown in Table 11, both InAttDi,t and InAttQi,t are 
negatively related to Scorei,t with a significance level of 5%, while InAttTi,t is 
insignificantly related to Scorei,t, suggesting that only the inattention of dedicated 
institutional investors and quasi-indexers shows a significant negative impact on CSR. 
These findings are consistent with hypothesis H3b and prior studies suggesting that 
dedicated institutional investors and quasi-indexers are active monitors in the stock 
                            
16 Please see Bushee (1998) for detailed descriptions of the nine variables.  
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market, while transient institutional investors have relatively low incentives to monitor 
managers (Appel et al. 2016; Borochin and Yang 2017). 
< Insert Table 11 about here> 
5. Conclusions 
We investigate the impact of institutional investors on CSR engagement of listed 
firms in China. To avoid endogeneity concerns on the two-way causality between 
institutional ownership and CSR engagement, we study how managers adjust their CSR 
decisions when their institutional investors are distracted by exogenous attention-
grabbing events and are thus inattentive. Using extreme industry returns as exogenous 
attention-grabbing events, we find a robust and negative relationship between 
institutional investor inattention and CSR. Further tests show that firms are less 
frequently visited by institutional investors when they are more inattentive to these 
firms. These findings suggest that the negative relationship is attributable to the 
principal conflict between managers and institutional investors. Managers are less 
motivated to engage in CSR when they are less monitored by institutional investors. 
Consistent with this argument, we find that the negative relationship is more 
pronounced for firms with higher expense ratios, less managerial ownership, weaker 
internal controls, and less analyst coverage, i.e., firms with more serious principal-agent 
problems or weaker corporate governances. Additionally, the negative relationship is 
more attributable to the inattention of institutional investors with larger monitoring 
incentives, that is, institutional investors with influential firm share fractions and/or 
long investment horizons, dedicated institutional investors and quasi-indexers. 
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The findings in our study suggest that institutional investors of Chinese listed firms 
demand CSR engagement, which in turn indicates that CSR is beneficial to shareholders 
for listed firms in China, the largest emerging market in the world. Therefore, we 
provide new empirical evidence on the debate on whether CSR is beneficial or harmful 
for shareholders and offer new insights into the relationship between institutional 
investors and CSR in emerging markets. We also extend the literature on limited 
attention in behavioral finance. Our study suggests that although institutional investors 
might be helpful in improving CSR performance for Chinese listed firms, their positive 
impact on CSR may be constrained by their limited attention. Managers are less 
motivated to create firm value through CSR when their institutional investors 
temporarily supply sub-optimal monitoring capacity as a result of limited attention. 
Additionally, by studying the relationship between CSR engagement and 
institutional investors’ attention variation caused by exogenous attention-grabbing 
events, our study is free from endogeneity concerns and thus provides meaningful 
insights for future studies regarding the impact of institutional investors on CSR actions. 
Although we use extreme industry returns as exogenous attention-grabbing events, 
events such as firm-specific news coverage and stock index re-constitutions may also 
be suitable to measure exogenous attention shocks. How these events induce 
institutional investors’ attention variation and thus affect corporate actions, including 
CSR engagement, is also of interest for future studies. 
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Appendix  
Variable definitions 
Variables  Definitions  Data sources  
Scorei,t The total RKS CSR score of firm i in year t.  RKS 
Mi,t The RKS macrocosm score of firm i in year t. RKS 
Ci,t The RKS content score of firm i in year t. RKS 
Ti,t The RKS technique score of firm i in year t. RKS 
Ii,t The RKS industry score of firm i in year t. RKS 
DDisi,t Dummy that equals 1 if firm i volunteers to disclose its CSR report in year t. RKS 
HXScorei,t The total CSR score of firm i in year t assigned by hexun.com.  hexun.com. 
SHolderi,t The shareholder responsibility score of firm i in year t assigned by hexun.com. hexun.com. 
Employeei,t The employee responsibility score of firm i in year t assigned by hexun.com. hexun.com. 
Customeri,t The customer responsibility score of firm i in year t assigned by hexun.com. hexun.com. 
Enviri,t The environmental responsibility score of firm i in year t assigned by 
hexun.com. 
hexun.com. 
Sociali,t The social responsibility score of firm i in year t assigned by hexun.com. hexun.com. 
DVisiti,t Dummy that equals 1 if firm i is visited by institutional investors at least once 
in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Firm annual 
reports 
NVisiti,t The log of 1 plus the number of times firm i is visited by institutional investors 
in year t. 
Firm annual 
reports 
DManui,t Dummy that equals 1 if firm i is in the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise. CSMAR 
DRatei,t Dummy that equals 1 if the information disclosure quality of firm i is relatively 
poor and hence is rated as C or D by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and 
0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
Reti,t  The market-adjusted stock return of firm i in year t. CSMAR 
Agei,t The log of years for which firm i has been listing in SZSE. CSMAR 
MSharei,t The market share of firm i in year t. CSMAR 
NFirmsi,t The log of the total number of listed firms in the city where firm i is 
headquartered. 
CSMAR 
GDPGrowthi,t The GDP growth of the city where firm i is headquartered. CSMAR 
  CSMAR 
InAtti,t The firm-level measure of institutional investor inattention following (Kempf et 
al. 2017). 
Wind  
,
n
i tInAttI   The firm-level inattention of the n
th institution type of institutional investors, 
n=1,2,…,10. Types 1 to 10 refers to insurance companies, public mutual funds, 
the national social security fund, exchange-traded funds, overseas institutional 
investors, corporate annuity plans, banks, trust companies, brokerage firms, and 
private investment funds, respectively. 
Wind 
InAttDi,t The firm-level inattention of dedicated institutional investors. Wind 
InAttTi,t The firm-level inattention of transient institutional investors. Wind 
InAttQi,t The firm-level inattention of quasi-indexers. Wind 
BMi,t Book value of assets over the market value of assets.  CSMAR 
Sizei,t The log of total year-end assets (in billion yuan).  CSMAR 
ROAi,t The return on assets in the year of t.  CSMAR 
Levi,t Total debt divided by total assets.  CSMAR 
SOEi,t Dummy that equals 1 for state-owned enterprises and equals 0 otherwise.  CSMAR 
Capexi,t Capital expenditure scaled by total assets.  CSMAR 
ACi,t The log of the number of analysts following in year t.  CSMAR 
IOi,t The total share percentage of institutional investors by the end of year t.  CSMAR 
BInepi,t The percentage of independent board directors. CSMAR 
BSizei,t The log of the number of board directors.  CSMAR 
Dualityi,t  Dummy that equals 1 if the CEO also chairs the board.  CSMAR 
MOi,t The share percentage of the top management team by the end of year t. CSMAR 
TOP1i,t The share percentage of the largest shareholder by the end of year t. CSMAR 
HHI5i,t The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index of share percentage of the top 5 shareholders. CSMAR 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables in this study. InAtti,t is a firm-level measure 
of institutional investor inattention following Kempf et al. (2017). Scorei,t, Mi,t, Ci,t, Ti,t, and Ii,t are the 
total and sub-categories of RKS CSR scores, respectively. BMi,t is the book value of assets over the 
market value of assets. Sizei,t is the log of total year-end assets (in billion yuan). ROAi,t is the return on 
assets in year t. Levi,t is the total debt divided by total assets. SOEi,t is a dummy that equals 1 for state-
owned enterprises and 0 otherwise. Capexi,t is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. ACi,t is the log 
of the number of following analysts in year t. IOi,t is the total share percentage of institutional investors 
by the end of year t. BInepi,t is the percentage of independent board directors. BSizei,t is the log of the 
number of board directors. Dualityi,t is a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO also chairs the board. MOi,t is 
the share percentage of the top management team by the end of year t. TOP1i,t is the share percentage of 
the largest shareholder by the end of year t. HHI5i,t is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index of the share 
percentage of the top 5 shareholders. 
Variables  # of obs Mean SD P25 Median P75 
InAtti,t (RAW) 12,556 0.0574 0.0900 0.0038 0.0202 0.0699 
Scorei,t 12,556 21.9686 21.5829 0 25.8832 37.6586 
Mi,t 10,242 7.2992 7.4441 0 7.266 13.1300 
Ci,t 10,242 9.5719 9.7249 0 10.5469 16.9400 
Ti,t 10,242 3.8109 3.7532 0 4.9632 6.6176 
Ii,t 8,243 1.0937 1.6662 0 0 1.6667 
BMi,t 12,556 0.9247 0.9849 0.3561 0.6099 1.0971 
Sizei,t 12,556 0.5629 1.4517 -0.4460 0.5465 1.5550 
ROAi,t 12,556 0.0445 0.0629 0.0249 0.0465 0.0728 
Levi,t 12,556 0.4629 0.2305 0.2933 0.4528 0.6133 
SOEi,t 12,556 0.4723 0.4992 0 0 1 
Capexi,t 12,556 0.0504 0.0497 0.0137 0.0354 0.0710 
ACi,t 12,556 1.1900 1.1574 0 1.0986 2.1972 
IOi,t 12,556 0.1805 0.1901 0.0323 0.1093 0.2716 
BInepi,t 12,556 0.3513 0.0822 0.3333 0.3333 0.7846 
BSizei,t 12,556 2.2851 0.1914 2.1972 2.3026 2.3026 
Dualityi,t  12,556 0.2325 0.4224 0 0 0 
MOi,t 12,556 0.0537 0.1261 0 0.0001 0.0165 
TOP1i,t 12,556 0.3526 0.1518 0.2325 0.3324 0.4570 
HHI5i,t 12,556 0.1673 0.1189 0.0755 0.1385 0.2318 
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Table 2 Pearson correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
This table reports the correlation matrix and variance inflation factors of the main variables in this study. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
Panel A Pearson correlation matrix 
 Score InAtt Size BM ROA Lev Capex AC SOE TOP1 IO MO HH5 Duality BSize 
Score 1                    
InAtt -0.409 1              
Size 0.466 -0.131 1             
BM 0.278 -0.108 0.081 1            
ROA -0.049 0.175 0.160 -0.164 1           
Lev 0.167 -0.069 0.046 0.473 -0.338 1          
Capex 0.055 -0.028 0.216 0.044 0.049 -0.018 1         
AC 0.223 0.261 0.552 0.00700 0.339 -0.151 0.242 1        
SOE 0.110 0.026 0.054 0.258 -0.085 0.222 -0.115 -0.102 1       
TOP1 0.027 0.009 0.045 0.111 0.108 0.020 0.041 0.116 0.207 1      
IO 0.181 0.038 0.387 0.051 0.081 0.020 0.117 0.256 0.016 0.073 1     
MO 0.088 0.008 -0.099 -0.214 0.134 -0.294 0.125 0.184 -0.380 -0.030 -0.091 1    
HH5 -0.041 0.132 -0.077 -0.089 0.133 -0.121 -0.015 0.206 -0.072 0.050 -0.053 0.124 1   
Duality 0.067 -0.010 0.058 0.124 0.120 0.009 0.049 0.140 0.179 0.960 0.085 -0.015 0.049 1  
BSize -0.051 -0.024 -0.071 -0.145 0.041 -0.146 0.108 0.047 -0.278 -0.049 -0.020 0.465 0.068 -0.047 1 
BIndep 0.176 -0.0160 0.072 0.229 0.020 0.136 -0.310 0.074 0.271 0.015 0.012 -0.174 0.024 0.036 -0.182 
Panel B Variance inflation factor 
  InAtt Size BM ROA Lev Capex AC SOE TOP1 IO MO HH5 Duality BSize 
VIF 1.21 1.57 1.35 1.37 1.85 1.21 1.67 1.26 4.53 1.05 1.29 1.12 4.57 1.19 
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Table 3 Baseline regression results 
This table reports the OLS regression results of the model (3) with a sample of Chinese listed firms from 
2009-2017. All variables are defined in the appendix. For the convenience of interpretation, InAtti,t is 
standardized to have zero mean and unit variance in all regressions. Year and industry fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and 
*** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Scorei,t Mi,t Ci,t Ti,t Ii,t 
InAtti,t -0.554** -0.306*** -0.142** -0.049 -0.086*** 
 (-1.99) (-3.27) (-2.01) (-0.93) (-4.39) 
Sizei,t 8.462*** 2.936*** 3.713*** 1.407*** 0.600*** 
 (26.15) (26.44) (24.86) (25.13) (22.49) 
BMi,t 3.817*** 1.282*** 1.682*** 0.677*** 0.354*** 
 (14.40) (14.39) (13.73) (14.59) (14.06) 
ROAi,t -19.500*** -7.604*** -8.799*** -2.748** -1.495*** 
 (-3.09) (-3.55) (-3.05) (-2.51) (-3.64) 
Levi,t -7.234*** -2.780*** -3.158*** -1.338*** -0.642*** 
 (-4.68) (-5.26) (-4.43) (-4.91) (-5.87) 
Capexi,t 10.072* 3.521* 5.094** 1.959** 0.449 
 (1.92) (1.95) (2.05) (2.09) (1.06) 
ACi,t 1.533*** 0.300*** 0.757*** 0.233*** 0.073*** 
 (5.15) (2.92) (5.54) (4.51) (3.48) 
SOEi,t 4.546*** 1.354*** 2.025*** 0.747*** 0.276*** 
 (7.93) (6.97) (7.66) (7.37) (6.40) 
TOP1i,t -0.381*** -0.121*** -0.162*** -0.060*** -0.048*** 
 (-6.41) (-5.91) (-5.85) (-5.69) (-10.04) 
IOi,t 5.142*** 2.285*** 1.630** 0.823*** 0.508*** 
 (3.62) (4.68) (2.50) (3.39) (4.41) 
MOi,t 6.148** 1.113 3.227** 1.086** 0.291 
 (2.07) (1.05) (2.51) (2.03) (1.57) 
HH5i,t -1.516 -1.818 -0.574 -0.630 0.489 
 (-0.28) (-1.02) (-0.23) (-0.66) (1.20) 
Dualityi,t 22.588*** 6.773*** 4.933*** 3.091*** 3.250*** 
 (7.07) (6.57) (6.58) (6.23) (10.39) 
BSizei,t 0.790 0.260 0.331 0.113 0.008 
 (1.07) (1.02) (0.97) (0.87) (0.16) 
BIndepi,t 6.417*** 1.892*** 3.066*** 0.918*** 0.553*** 
 (3.96) (3.43) (4.10) (3.21) (4.06) 
Constant -20.399*** -6.133*** -9.904*** -3.014*** -1.588*** 
 (-4.15) (-3.64) (-4.32) (-3.49) (-3.91) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 12,556 10,242 10,242 10,242 8,243 
Adj-R2 0.347 0.342 0.333 0.326 0.377 
F-statistics  214.815 206.632 200.717 192.335 103.663 
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Table 4 Robust test: alternative proxies for CSR engagement 
In this table, we check the robustness of the negative relationship between institutional investor 
inattention and CSR engagement with alternative CSR proxies. In column (1), we measure firms’ CSR 
engagement with the dummy DDisi,t, which equals 1 if firm i volunteers to disclose its CSR report in 
year t and equals 0 otherwise. Firms that are mandated to disclose CSR reports according to the 
requirements of the China Security Regulation Committee (CSRC) are excluded in column (1). In 
columns (2) to (7), firms’ CSR engagement is measured by their CSR scores assigned by hexun.com 
(HX), a leading financial media company in China. Since HX began rating CSR scores in 2010, the 
sample period in columns (2) to (7) is 2010-2017. HXScore indicates firms’ total CSR scores, while 
SHolder, Employee, Customer, Envir, and Social indicate scores for shareholder responsibility, employee 
responsibility, customer responsibility, environmental responsibility, and social responsibility, 
respectively. For the convenience of interpretation, InAtti,t is standardized to have a zero mean and unit 
variance in all regressions. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. The z-statistics 
in parentheses of columns (1) and t-statistics in parentheses of columns (2) to (7) are based on robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5 (6) (7) 
 DDisi,t HXScorei,t SHolderi,t Employeei,t Customeri,t Enviri,t Sociali,t 
InAtti,t -0.014** -0.592* -0.004 -0.292*** -0.245** -0.214* -0.025 
 (-2.33) (-1.85) (-0.07) (-4.36) (-2.35) (-1.88) (-0.29) 
Sizei,t 0.814*** 3.922*** 0.410*** 0.926*** 1.127*** 1.206*** 0.274*** 
 (18.35) (11.37) (5.70) (12.54) (9.64) (9.80) (2.97) 
BMi,t 0.396*** 2.403*** 0.573*** 0.394*** 0.256*** 0.378*** 0.736*** 
 (9.64) (8.23) (7.63) (6.05) (2.73) (3.54) (7.65) 
ROAi,t -1.590* 103.899*** 84.029*** -0.414 -0.942 -1.173 20.729*** 
 (-1.81) (15.86) (39.18) (-0.30) (-0.48) (-0.55) (12.65) 
Levi,t -0.675*** -4.709*** -3.037*** -0.592 -1.737*** -1.735*** 2.310*** 
 (-3.13) (-2.82) (-7.46) (-1.59) (-3.09) (-3.06) (4.84) 
Capexi,t 0.981 5.592 1.319 0.264 1.724 0.350 2.393 
 (1.43) (0.98) (1.14) (0.21) (0.93) (0.17) (1.49) 
ACi,t 0.206*** 2.458*** 1.033*** 0.386*** 0.594*** 0.350*** 0.219** 
 (5.23) (7.86) (15.37) (5.65) (5.73) (3.25) (2.51) 
SOEi,t 0.532*** 2.745*** 0.088 0.802*** 0.799*** 1.284*** -0.300* 
 (7.00) (4.66) (0.68) (6.17) (4.02) (6.53) (-1.71) 
TOP1i,t -0.021*** -0.134** -0.027** -0.035** -0.006 -0.048** -0.014 
 (-2.71) (-2.19) (-2.10) (-2.46) (-0.30) (-2.13) (-0.81) 
IOi,t 0.186 2.472 1.134*** 0.141 0.509 -1.322*** 1.744*** 
 (1.10) (1.64) (3.46) (0.41) (1.02) (-2.60) (4.44) 
MOi,t 3.876*** 4.439 4.189*** 1.259** 3.207*** 3.198*** 0.643 
 (3.38) (1.61) (5.08) (2.06) (3.70) (4.05) (0.62) 
HH5i,t -0.382 -24.646*** -6.785*** -6.692*** -3.675* 5.305** -16.263*** 
 (-0.53) (-4.22) (-5.53) (-5.27) (-1.85) (2.50) (-10.23) 
Dualityi,t 1.187** 9.208** 4.246*** 2.693*** 0.342 3.855*** -0.491 
 (2.37) (2.56) (3.95) (2.74) (0.14) (2.79) (-0.25) 
BSizei,t 0.100 0.343 -0.078 -0.032 0.206 0.067 0.143 
 (0.99) (0.46) (-0.44) (-0.19) (0.82) (0.27) (0.66) 
BIndepi,t 0.570*** 3.494** 1.021*** 0.433 1.101** 1.111* -0.510 
 (2.74) (2.05) (2.88) (1.12) (2.02) (1.85) (-1.07) 
Constant -3.907*** 8.291 3.606*** 1.847 -0.162 0.036 4.437*** 
 (-6.27) (1.55) (3.30) (1.54) (-0.08) (0.02) (2.96) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 7,557 10,242 10,242 10,242 10,242 10,242 10,242 
Adj-R2  0.319 0.620 0.240 0.224 0.215 0.144 
Pseudo R2 0.182       
F-statistics  116.187 218.405 86.666 47.116 69.666 31.240 
Wald Chi2 896.364       
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Table 5 Robustness test: omitted variables 
In this table, we use the change in firms’ CSR scores as dependent variables and include firm fixed effects 
in regressions to address the concern that the negative relationship between institutional investor 
inattention and CSR engagement shown in Table 3 is driven by omitted variables. d. Scorei,t, d. Mi,t, d. 
Ci,t, d. Ti,t, and d. Ii,t are the change in total RKS CSR scores, macrocosm scores (M), content scores (C), 
technique scores (T) and industry scores (I), respectively. For the convenience of interpretation, InAtti,t 
is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance in all regressions. In addition to firm fixed effects, 
year fixed effects are also included in all regressions. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 d.Scorei,t d.Mi,t d.Ci,t d.Ti,t d.Ii,t 
InAtti,t -0.081** -0.012** -0.059** 0.000 -0.010 
 (-2.27) (-2.41) (-2.38) (0.02) (-0.94) 
Sizei,t 0.194* 0.063* -0.006 0.075*** 0.064*** 
 (1.92) (1.83) (-0.14) (5.17) (4.07) 
BMi,t -0.331*** 0.030 -0.069** -0.045*** 0.013 
 (-4.38) (1.10) (-1.99) (-3.78) (0.96) 
ROAi,t 1.430 1.065* 0.380 -0.499* 0.253 
 (0.82) (1.81) (0.50) (-1.95) (1.02) 
Levi,t 1.420*** 0.044 0.226 0.099 0.064 
 (3.08) (0.29) (1.23) (1.54) (0.96) 
Capexi,t 1.162 0.924 0.290 0.208 0.008 
 (0.67) (1.64) (0.42) (0.86) (0.03) 
ACi,t 0.556*** 0.083*** 0.088** -0.005 0.018 
 (6.49) (2.99) (2.56) (-0.46) (1.45) 
SOEi,t 0.640*** 0.167*** 0.001 0.025 0.053** 
 (3.97) (3.10) (0.02) (1.10) (2.28) 
TOP1i,t -0.015 -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.006** 
 (-0.83) (-0.30) (0.09) (0.63) (-1.97) 
IOi,t 1.419*** 0.481*** 0.292* 0.246*** 0.115* 
 (4.15) (4.06) (1.92) (4.74) (1.96) 
MOi,t 1.665 0.458 -0.185 0.080 -0.019 
 (1.30) (1.01) (-0.39) (0.46) (-0.13) 
HH5i,t 2.292 0.248 -0.514 -0.060 0.110 
 (1.26) (0.43) (-0.77) (-0.25) (0.45) 
Dualityi,t 3.487 0.702 0.370 -0.130 0.690** 
 (1.56) (0.93) (0.41) (-0.40) (1.97) 
BSizei,t 0.155 0.068 0.062 0.014 -0.034 
 (0.70) (0.89) (0.70) (0.43) (-1.09) 
BIndepi,t 0.740 0.245 0.210 -0.006 0.157** 
 (1.57) (1.52) (1.09) (-0.09) (2.15) 
Constant -2.556* -0.815 -0.627 -0.113 -0.392* 
 (-1.71) (-1.63) (-1.03) (-0.54) (-1.68) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 9,774 8,024 8,024 8,024 6,889 
Adj-R2 0.053 0.046 0.026 0.054 0.058 
F-statistics  11.092 6.186 4.623 5.452 5.126 
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Table 6 Robustness test: lagged institutional investor inattention proxies 
In this table, we regress CSR proxies on institutional investor inattention proxies that are lagged for one 
or two quarters. In Panel A, 1
,
q
i tInAtt is the aggregation of firm i’s quarterly institutional investor inattention 
proxy in quarter 4 of year t-1, and those in quarters 1, 2 and 3 of year t. In Panel B, 2
,
q
i tInAtt
is the 
aggregation of firm i’s quarterly institutional investor inattention proxies in quarters 3 and 4 of year t-1, 
and those in quarters 1 and 2 of year t. All other variables are defined in the appendix. For brevity, we 
omit results on control variables. 1
,
q
i tInAtt  and 2,
q
i tInAtt
are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance 
in all regressions. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively.  
Panel A One-quarter-lagged inattention proxies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Scorei,t Mi,t Ci,t Ti,t Ii,t 
1
,
q
i tInAtt   
-0.580** -0.219** -0.133* -0.045 -0.082*** 
(-2.16) (-2.38) (-1.92) (-0.89) (-4.01) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 11,241 9,784 9,784 9,784 8,008 
Adj-R2 0.325 0.311 0.309 0.334 0.329 
F-statistics  211.457 205.014 212.479 202.565 111.246 
Panel B Two-quarter-lagged inattention proxies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Scorei,t Mi,t Ci,t Ti,t Ii,t 
2
,
q
i tInAtt  
-0.576** -0.295*** -0.101* -0.055 -0.072*** 
(-2.09) (-2.77) (-1.79) (-1.22) (-3.69) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 10,157 9,141 9,141 9,141 7,848 
Adj-R2 0.296 0.318 0.305 0.289 0.344 
F-statistics  205.221 197.154 211.326 208.547 121.875 
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Table 7 Robustness test: the impact of institutional investor inattention on site visits 
In this table, we study the impact of institutional investor inattention on site visits. DVisiti,t equals 1 if 
firm i is visited by institutional investors at least once in year t and equals 0 otherwise. NVisiti,t is the log 
of 1 plus the number of times firm i is visited by institutional investors in year t. DManui,t equals 1 if 
firm i is in the manufacturing industry and equals 0 otherwise. DRatei,t equals 1 if the information 
disclosure quality of firm i is relatively poor and hence is rated as C or D by the SZSE and equals 0 
otherwise. Reti,t is the market adjusted stock return of firm i in year t. Agei,t is the natural logarithm of 
years for which firm i has been listing in SZSE. MSharei,t is the market share of firm i in year t. NFirmsi,t 
is the natural logarithm of the total number of listed firms in the city where firm i is headquartered, while 
GDPGrowthi,t is the GDP growth of the city where firm i is headquartered. For the convenience of 
interpretation, InAtti,t is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance in all regressions. All variables 
are defined in the appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. The z-statistics 
in parentheses of column (1) and t-statistics in parentheses of column (2) are based on robust standard 
errors. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) DVisiti,t (2) NVisiti,t 
InAtti,t -0.125** -0.036** 
 (-2.29) (-1.98) 
DManui,t 0.107** 0.071** 
 (2.41) (2.32) 
DRatei,t 0.197*** 0.099*** 
 (4.13) (3.86) 
Reti,t -0.144*** -0.025** 
 (-4.01) (-2.33) 
IOi,t 0.044 0.021 
 (0.44) (0.25) 
ACi,t 0.047** 0.025* 
 (2.53) (1.80) 
BMi,t 0.010 -0.006 
 (0.84) (-0.84) 
Sizei,t 0.187*** 0.075*** 
 (4.25) (3.19) 
ROAi,t 0.039 0.011 
 (0.11) (0.63) 
Levi,t -0.097 0.005 
 (-1.05) (0.25) 
Agei,t 0.021 -0.011* 
 (0.82) (-1.79) 
SOEi,t -0.045* -0.025 
 (-1.72) (-1.54) 
MSharei,t-1 0.219*** 0.107** 
 (2.63) (2.36) 
NFirmsi,t 0.028* 0.012** 
 (1.69) (2.03) 
GDPGrowthi,t 1.413*** 0.712*** 
 (6.44) (3.46) 
Constant 0.799*** 0.344* 
 (5.61) (1.83) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
# of obs 5,628 5,628 
Adj-R2  0.196 
Pseudo R2 0.115  
F-statistics  34.552 
LR chi2 754.622  
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Table 8 Sub-sample analyses by agency cost and managerial ownership 
In this table, we investigate the impact of agency costs and managerial ownership on the relationship 
between institutional investor inattention and CSR engagement. The observations used in columns (1) 
and (2) are from firms with high agency costs and low agency costs, respectively. Following Ang et al. 
(2000), agency costs are measured by the expense ratio, which is the operating expense scaled by annual 
sales. A firm is considered to have high agency costs if its expense ratio is above the sample median in 
year t and otherwise is considered to have low agency costs. The observations used in columns (3) and 
(4) are from firms with high managerial ownership and low managerial ownership, respectively. A firm 
is considered to have managerial ownership if its managerial ownership is above the sample median in 
year t and otherwise is considered to have low managerial ownership. For the convenience of 
interpretation, InAtti,t is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance in all regressions. Year and 
industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dep var=Scorei,t 
Panel A Agency costs  Panel B Managerial ownership 
(1) High (2) Low (3) High (4) Low 
InAtti,t -0.691** -0.257 0.094 -0.918** 
 (-2.01)  (-0.68)  (0.69) (-2.31) 
Sizei,t 7.689*** 9.036*** 7.403*** 9.123*** 
 (17.54) (19.16) (15.56) (20.37) 
BMi,t 2.921*** 4.470*** 4.061*** 3.702*** 
 (7.54) (12.28) (10.45) (9.99) 
ROAi,t -26.387*** -11.845 -21.770*** -14.136 
 (-2.99) (-1.33) (-2.82) (-1.30) 
Levi,t -1.117 -12.407*** -3.376 -11.626*** 
 (-0.51) (-5.72) (-1.60) (-5.01) 
Capexi,t 26.559*** -4.845 11.727 9.526 
 (3.79) (-0.64) (1.65) (1.24) 
ACi,t 1.564*** 1.570*** 1.932*** 1.062** 
 (3.76) (3.68) (4.79) (2.39) 
SOEi,t 5.515*** 3.929*** 3.525*** 5.637*** 
 (7.07) (4.38) (4.59) (6.43) 
TOP1i,t -0.218** -0.611*** -0.194** -0.538*** 
 (-2.48) (-7.27) (-2.21) (-6.56) 
IOi,t 5.334** 4.897*** 6.061*** 4.934** 
 (2.48) (2.63) (2.96) (2.50) 
MOi,t 6.040* 0.678 -1.532 8.215*** 
 (1.84) (1.63) (-0.45) (3.42) 
HH5i,t 10.250 -7.374 -6.681 3.028 
 (1.37) (-1.00) (-0.84) (0.41) 
Dualityi,t 44.188*** 71.382*** 28.037** 70.762*** 
 (3.71) (7.18) (2.52) (7.02) 
BSizei,t 0.103 1.909 1.447 -0.224 
 (0.11) (1.64) (1.53) (-0.19) 
BIndepi,t 10.041*** 4.337* 10.095*** 1.732 
 (4.30) (1.88) (4.21) (0.78) 
Constant -39.518*** -4.488 -32.281*** -5.460 
 (-5.61) (-0.65) (-4.61) (-0.79) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 
Adj-R2 0.329 0.374 0.333 0.357 
F-statistics 110.621 123.532 129.918 103.472 
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Table 9 Sub-sample analyses by internal control quality and analyst coverage 
In this table, we investigate the impact of internal control quality and analyst coverage on the relationship 
between institutional investor inattention and CSR engagement. Observations used in column (1) are 
from firms with relatively high internal control quality, while observations used in column (2) are from 
firms with relatively low internal control quality. We measure firms’ internal control quality with their 
DIB internal control index values provided by the DIB internal control and risk management firm in 
China. A firm-year observation is classified into the sub-sample of high (low) internal control quality if 
its DIB internal control index value is above (below) the sample median in year t. Observations used in 
column (3) are from firms with high analyst coverage, while observations used in column (4) are from 
firms with low analyst coverage. A firm-year observation is classified into the sub-sample of high (low) 
analyst coverage if its analyst coverage is above (below) the sample median in year t. For the convenience 
of interpretation, InAtti,t is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance in all regressions. Year and 
industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dep var=Scorei,t 
Panel A Internal control quality Panel B Mandatory CSR disclosures  
(1) High  (2) Low  (3) High (4) Low  
InAtti,t 0.035 -0.897** -0.456 -0.668* 
 (0.08) (-2.48) (-1.24) (-1.94) 
Sizei,t 8.234*** 3.477*** 8.940*** 8.074*** 
 (18.00) (8.80) (20.99) (15.51) 
BMi,t 2.989*** 1.059** 3.953*** 3.432*** 
 (8.29) (2.56) (10.97) (8.49) 
ROAi,t -41.662*** -26.585*** -35.238*** -19.180** 
 (-3.76) (-4.27) (-3.13) (-2.36) 
Levi,t -0.013 -4.074** -9.236*** -6.029*** 
 (-0.00) (-2.57) (-3.78) (-3.00) 
Capexi,t -2.925 0.230 5.651 12.007 
 (-0.44) (0.04) (0.82) (1.49) 
ACi,t 0.004 0.398 1.380*** 1.436*** 
 (0.01) (1.31) (3.18) (3.36) 
SOEi,t 2.052** 2.010*** 4.463*** 4.331*** 
 (2.14) (3.37) (5.22) (5.61) 
TOP1i,t -0.519*** -0.094 -0.430*** -0.303*** 
 (-6.69) (-1.35) (-5.25) (-3.41) 
IOi,t 7.907*** 2.445 5.261*** 5.227** 
 (5.10) (1.41) (2.70) (2.53) 
MOi,t 10.495** 0.160 -2.309 17.156*** 
 (2.41) (0.06) (-0.62) (3.05) 
HH5i,t -36.782*** -1.643 -12.177* 12.739 
 (-4.21) (-0.30) (-1.75) (1.53) 
Dualityi,t 62.847*** 12.380 58.065*** 42.662*** 
 (6.76) (1.39) (5.88) (3.65) 
BSizei,t 0.607 0.544 1.283 0.241 
 (0.52) (0.74) (1.16) (0.24) 
BIndepi,t 1.089 7.157*** 4.350* 8.428*** 
 (0.55) (3.82) (1.94) (3.58) 
Constant  28.227*** -13.521** -10.861 -27.250*** 
 (4.16) (-2.16) (-1.60) (-3.78) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 
Adj-R2 0.421 0.076 0.388 0.276 
F-statistics 53.545 10.538 147.181 68.245 
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Table 10 The impact of institution types 
In this table, we classify institutional investors into ten types according to their institution types. We calculate the yearly inattention of each institutional investor with the model 
(1) and aggregate them at the institution-firm level (
,
n
i tInAttI , n=1,2,…,10). ,
n
i tInAttI stands for the inattention of insurance companies, public mutual funds, the national social 
security fund, exchange-traded funds, overseas institutional investors, corporate annuity plans, banks, trust companies, brokerage firms, and private investment funds in columns 
(1) to (10), respectively. For the convenience of interpretation, 
,
n
i tInAttI is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance in all regressions. All variables are defined in the 
appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dep Var= 
Scorei,t 
(1) 
Insurance 
companies 
(2) 
Mutual 
funds 
(3) 
Social security 
fund 
(4) 
ETF 
(5) 
Overseas  
(6) 
Annuity 
plans 
(7) 
Banks 
(8) 
Trust 
companies 
(9) 
Brokerage 
firms 
(10) 
Private 
funds 
,
n
i tInAttI   -0.750** -0.870* -0.170*** 0.083 -0.262 -0.448 -0.064 -0.615 0.019 0.131 
 (-2.17) (-1.92) (-4.71) (0.22) (-1.30) (-1.37) (-0.31) (-1.04) (0.15) (1.41) 
Sizei,t 8.618*** 8.629*** 8.599*** 8.622*** 8.605*** 8.517*** 8.595*** 8.625*** 8.619*** 8.622*** 
 (27.34) (27.36) (27.23) (27.37) (27.29) (26.29) (27.18) (27.35) (27.32) (27.35) 
BMi,t 3.859*** 3.857*** 3.866*** 3.857*** 3.856*** 3.850*** 3.848*** 3.858*** 3.859*** 3.861*** 
 (14.57) (14.56) (14.60) (14.57) (14.56) (14.54) (14.54) (14.57) (14.57) (14.58) 
ROAi,t -20.217*** -20.342*** -20.335*** -20.242*** -20.278*** -19.974*** -20.397*** -20.301*** -20.236*** -20.222*** 
 (-3.21) (-3.23) (-3.23) (-3.22) (-3.22) (-3.17) (-3.24) (-3.23) (-3.22) (-3.21) 
Levi,t -7.398*** -7.357*** -7.476*** -7.383*** -7.354*** -7.333*** -7.341*** -7.385*** -7.385*** -7.405*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.77) (-4.85) (-4.78) (-4.76) (-4.75) (-4.76) (-4.79) (-4.79) (-4.80) 
Capexi,t 10.039* 9.925* 10.143* 10.040* 10.163* 10.133* 10.004* 9.949* 10.027* 9.978* 
 (1.91) (1.89) (1.93) (1.91) (1.94) (1.93) (1.91) (1.89) (1.91) (1.90) 
ACi,t 1.352*** 1.357*** 1.375*** 1.348*** 1.355*** 1.444*** 1.389*** 1.352*** 1.349*** 1.354*** 
 (4.85) (4.87) (4.92) (4.84) (4.86) (4.99) (4.96) (4.85) (4.84) (4.86) 
SOEi,t 4.454*** 4.461*** 4.480*** 4.446*** 4.458*** 4.483*** 4.471*** 4.458*** 4.452*** 4.443*** 
 (7.82) (7.84) (7.85) (7.81) (7.84) (7.86) (7.86) (7.83) (7.82) (7.81) 
TOP1i,t -0.383*** -0.383*** -0.385*** -0.384*** -0.383*** -0.383*** -0.385*** -0.384*** -0.383*** -0.383*** 
 (-6.45) (-6.44) (-6.48) (-6.46) (-6.45) (-6.45) (-6.48) (-6.47) (-6.45) (-6.44) 
IOi,t 4.994*** 4.985*** 5.033*** 4.992*** 4.983*** 5.091*** 5.051*** 4.985*** 4.992*** 4.994*** 
 (3.53) (3.52) (3.56) (3.53) (3.52) (3.59) (3.57) (3.52) (3.53) (3.53) 
MOi,t 5.930** 5.984** 6.015** 5.917** 5.982** 6.039** 5.956** 5.907** 5.913** 5.914** 
 (2.00) (2.02) (2.03) (2.00) (2.02) (2.04) (2.01) (1.99) (1.99) (1.99) 
HH5i,t -1.837 -1.734 -1.941 -1.851 -1.941 -1.548 -1.715 -1.852 -1.864 -2.115 
 (-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.36) (-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.29) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.40) 
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Dualityi,t 53.087*** 53.003*** 53.235*** 53.151*** 53.155*** 52.969*** 53.270*** 53.198*** 53.112*** 53.062*** 
 (7.13) (7.13) (7.16) (7.15) (7.15) (7.12) (7.16) (7.15) (7.14) (7.13) 
BSizei,t 0.808 0.815 0.796 0.810 0.811 0.789 0.778 0.808 0.809 0.811 
 (1.09) (1.10) (1.08) (1.09) (1.10) (1.06) (1.05) (1.09) (1.09) (1.10) 
BIndepi,t 6.496*** 6.504*** 6.460*** 6.491*** 6.545*** 6.466*** 6.419*** 6.480*** 6.501*** 6.477*** 
 (4.00) (4.01) (3.98) (4.00) (4.03) (3.99) (3.95) (3.99) (4.01) (3.99) 
Constant -20.351*** -20.044*** -20.287*** -20.332*** -20.514*** -20.400*** -20.225*** -20.278*** -20.354*** -20.262*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.07) (-4.13) (-4.13) (-4.17) (-4.15) (-4.11) (-4.12) (-4.14) (-4.12) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 12,556 12,556 12,556 12,556 12,556 12,556 12,556 12,556 12,556 12,556 
Adj-R2 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 
F-statistics 214.264 215.255 214.524 214.508 214.224 214.417 215.370 215.953 214.300 214.399 
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Table 11 The impact of institutional investors’ trading styles 
In this table, we investigate whether the impact of institutional investors is determined by their trading 
styles. Following Bushee (1998) and Bushee and Noe (2000), we classify institutional investors into 
dedicated institutional investors, transient institutional investors and quasi-indexers according to their 
portfolio concentration, portfolio turnover, and trading strategies. We construct proxies for the inattention 
of dedicated institutional investors, transient institutional investors and quasi-indexers and denote them 
as InAttDi,t, InAttTi,t and InAttQi,t, respectively. For convenience of interpretation, InAttDi,t, InAttTi,t and 
InAttQi,t are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance in all regressions. All variables are defined 
in the appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
Dep Var=Scorei,t (1) (2) (3) 
InAttDi,t -0.379**   
 (-1.96)   
InAttTi,t  -0.038  
  (-0.12)  
InAttQi,t   -0.515** 
   (-2.25) 
Sizei,t 8.554*** 8.607*** 8.616*** 
 (26.92) (26.14) (27.35) 
BMi,t 3.833*** 3.857*** 3.866*** 
 (14.43) (14.56) (14.60) 
ROAi,t -20.165*** -20.201*** -19.943*** 
 (-3.20) (-3.21) (-3.17) 
Levi,t -7.318*** -7.381*** -7.409*** 
 (-4.74) (-4.78) (-4.80) 
Capexi,t 10.003* 10.034* 9.986* 
 (1.91) (1.91) (1.90) 
ACi,t 1.415*** 1.359*** 1.342*** 
 (5.00) (4.64) (4.82) 
SOEi,t 4.459*** 4.459*** 4.488*** 
 (7.84) (7.77) (7.88) 
TOP1i,t -0.381*** -0.383*** -0.384*** 
 (-6.41) (-6.45) (-6.46) 
IOi,t 5.040*** 5.000*** 4.987*** 
 (3.56) (3.53) (3.53) 
MOi,t 5.749* 5.940** 5.893** 
 (1.94) (2.00) (1.99) 
HH5i,t -1.912 -1.837 -1.779 
 (-0.36) (-0.34) (-0.33) 
Dualityi,t 12.808*** 13.096*** 13.109*** 
 (7.10) (7.14) (7.15) 
BSizei,t 0.812 0.808 0.804 
 (1.10) (1.09) (1.09) 
BIndepi,t 6.459*** 6.499*** 6.470*** 
 (3.98) (4.01) (3.99) 
Constant -20.299*** -20.352*** -20.298*** 
 (-4.13) (-4.14) (-4.13) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 12,556 12,556 12,556 
Adj-R2 0.353 0.352 0.353 
F-statistics 211.701 211.208 210.988 
 
 
  
